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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PRIVATIZATION AND 
DEMOCRACY: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR ROSE 
MARK P. McKENNA* 
The broad thesis of Professor Rose’s article Privatization: The Road to 
Democracy? is an important reminder that no institution deserves all the credit 
for democratization, and that the success of any particular institution in 
promoting democracy depends to a greater or lesser extent on the existence and 
functioning of other political institutions.1  While protection of private property 
has proven quite important to successful democratic reform, we should not be 
lulled into thinking private property can carry the whole weight of reform.  
That lesson has particular significance in the context of intellectual property, 
given proponents’ general tendency to overstate the significance of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) in encouraging innovation.2 
But even if they play a small role in promoting democracy, this Paper 
argues that IPRs can and do play a role that should not be overlooked.  In at 
least some cases, IPRs can help create the conditions in which democracy can 
succeed.  Specifically, copyright protection shifts control over the content of 
creative expression away from the government and into the market.  In so 
doing, copyright encourages development of a pluralistic and independent 
culture.  At the same time, patent protection, particularly in the modern 
economy, can help create the economic conditions that allow for stable civil 
society.  These arguments, of course, do not justify any and all extensions of an 
intellectual property (IP) regime.  But they are based on solid evidence and 
deserve consideration by policy-makers hoping to promote democracy. 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University.  © 2006 Mark P. McKenna. 
 1. Carol M. Rose, Privatization: The Road to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691, 693–
94 (2006) (stating that “privatization and democratic governance cannot be seen simply as 
ancestor-to-successor, where the one (privatization) precedes the other (democratization).  At 
most (to continue the family analogy) privatization and democratization are siblings, co-existing 
in a mixed environment of mutual support, dependence, and occasional rivalry”). 
 2. Michele Boldrin and David Levine have argued that IPRs are not necessary at all to 
promote innovation.  Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Perfectly Competitive Innovation 2 
(Aug. 28, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.dklevine.com/papers/pcibasic14.pdf (“The 
claim that monopoly is necessary for innovation is not correct either as a matter of theory, or as a 
matter of fact.”). 
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I.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS PRIVATIZATION 
Before discussing the democratizing effects of IP specifically, I want to 
make two points about the way in which Professor Rose frames her thesis.  
Though distinct points on some level, both urge a more granular approach to 
analyzing intellectual property’s impact in encouraging democracy.  
“Intellectual property” is a relatively broad phrase that encompasses several 
different rights regimes (patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret, as well as 
other related rights), and each of those forms of protection has its own 
relationship with democratic development.  A full account of those 
relationships is beyond the scope of this short Essay, but I hope to highlight a 
couple of ways in which a lack of context-sensitivity might obscure important 
aspects of the relationship between particular forms of IP and democratic 
society. 
A. The Typology of Privatization 
Professor Rose frames her paper around a typology of privatization 
measures, identifying “recognition,” “deregulation,” “divestment,” and 
“enablement” measures.3  IPRs, according to Professor Rose, are prototypical 
“enablement” measures, which she defines as governmental measures to 
establish and protect property rights in resources that would otherwise not 
easily be turned into property at all.4  This characterization of IP, however, 
oversimplifies the role of IPRs because it does not sufficiently account for the 
alternatives to particular forms of protection. 
The concept of privatization implies a comparison with a prior baseline 
state of governmental involvement.  To regard something as a privatization 
measure is to identify a shift from a system substantially under the control of 
the government towards a system substantially dependent on private ordering.  
Privatization, in other words, suggests a change from more government 
involvement to less.  One can describe that change more particularly in a 
variety of ways: as a separation of economic decision-making and the public 
sphere or as a change in the nature of relationships from cooperative to 
competitive and exclusive, for example.5  All of these elucidations, however, 
have in common a general sense that governmental involvement has decreased 
as compared to the prior baseline level. 
 
 3. Rose, supra note 1, at 694–98. 
 4. Id. at 697. 
 5. See Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 395 (2003).  
Ghosh catalogs various definitions of privatization and notes that “[a]lthough much has been 
written about privatization, a general definition of the term in the scholarly literature is elusive.”  
Id.  Ultimately he settles on a definition that focuses on “the delegation of the decision-making 
function historically assigned to a governmental entity to a non-governmental entity.”  Id. 
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What Professor Rose calls “divestiture” measures, those by which whole 
enterprises are removed from governmental administration and placed in 
private hands, are paradigmatic of this shift.6  “Deregulation,” one of Professor 
Rose’s other categories,7 also fits the more-government to less-government 
model, because deregulation returns more economic decision-making 
responsibility to the private sector.  But at least one of Professor Rose’s 
examples may run in the opposite direction. 
What Professor Rose calls “recognition” measures, those that provide the 
administrative means to regularize private property ownership,8 in some sense 
introduce greater governmental regulation than the baseline state.  Land titling, 
for example, is a process through which a government recognizes and enforces 
previously inchoate and less stable claims that had been enforced informally.9  
Among other things, once land is titled formally owners can rely on the state to 
mediate disputes regarding their property rather than resorting to alternative 
private enforcement mechanisms.10  Recognition measures, then, represent a 
move from less government to more government.  There may be consequences 
for democratization that flow from such efforts, but in light of the pre-
recognition level of state involvement, Professor Rose accepts too easily the 
characterization of those efforts as privatization measures.  And because IP, 
which serves as Rose’s example of an “enablement” measure, is in this sense 
more analogous to recognition measures than to divestiture or deregulation, it 
fits uneasily into the privatization typology. 
Professor Rose argues that IPRs “effectively privatize the uses of 
inventions and expressions that would otherwise be open to copying by the 
general public.”11  I want to suggest, however, that IPRs are better viewed 
through a comparative institutional lens.  At least some IPRs are grants of 
formal rights in place of less formal and less efficient measures that creators 
might take to protect the same matter in the absence of formal protection.  
Patent law, for example, has long been thought to promote disclosure of 
information that companies might not generate or would take inefficient steps 
to conceal in the absence of legal protection.12  If the prospect of patent 
 
 6. Rose, supra note 1, at 696. 
 7. Id. at 695. 
 8. Id. at 694. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 703 (discussing the role of barrio insiders who accept payment to protect residents’ 
informal property claims); Bernadette Atuahene, Land Titling: A Mode of Privatization with the 
Potential to Deepen Democracy, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 761, 775–76 (2006) (noting the incentives 
that land titling creates to invest in society’s dispute resolution mechanisms). 
 11. Rose, supra note 1, at 697. 
 12. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).  Describing the 
purpose of the patent system, the Aronson Court maintained that 
[f]irst, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes disclosure of 
inventions, to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice the 
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protection in fact induces disclosure of information that would otherwise 
remain secret, then the choice of whether or not to grant patent rights is not 
really one between “property” and “free access.”  Rather, the choice is a more 
complicated one between the modes of protection that creators employ, 
assuming they are willing to create at all absent formal legal protection.13 
So understood, IPRs sound a good deal like the formal rights granted in 
systems of regularized titling: they exist because of concerns that, in their 
absence, creators might otherwise take inefficient measures to protect their 
interests through more informal mechanisms.14  And while some of those 
alternative methods of protection have government backing (trade secret 
protection, for example), there is little doubt that, with their registration 
systems and administrative apparatus,15 the patent and copyright regimes 
reflect much greater government involvement than do the alternatives.  That is 
true even if one can imagine regimes of even greater governmental 
involvement—perhaps systems of direct subsidization of research or patronage 
of cultural production like those that characterized the English system prior to 
American colonization.16 
 
invention once the patent expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent protection 
seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public. 
Id.; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1029 (1989). 
[I]t seems likely that the patent system at least facilitates disclosure by creating rights in 
inventions that survive disclosure.  Secrecy makes it difficult for inventors to sell or 
license their inventions to others because it is difficult to persuade someone to pay for an 
idea without disclosing it, yet once the invention is disclosed, the inventor has nothing left 
to sell. 
Id.  The dilemma that Eisenberg describes as facing inventors is often called the “information 
paradox” and that nomenclature is widely credited to Kenneth Arrow.  Kenneth J. Arrow, 
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION 
OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614–16 (1962). 
 13. There is a distinction to be drawn here between the objects of patent protection and those 
of copyright protection.  Patent protection serves two production side functions: to drive 
investment towards certain inventions that otherwise would not be pursued and to encourage 
disclosure of some inventions that would be produced even in the absence of patent protection.  
Copyright law probably does more of the latter since its effect is probably predominantly on the 
willingness of distributors to disseminate creative content. 
 14. See Rose, supra note 1, at 703–04. 
 15. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–351 (2000). 
 16. Indeed, if privatization entails some comparison to a baseline condition, then to whatever 
extent recognition of intellectual property rights can be described as an instance of privatization, 
the privatization happened centuries ago in England.  Though the scope of IP protection has 
broadened considerably over time, the basic concept of recognizing private rights in intangible 
information dates back at least as far as the Statute of Monopolies and the Statute of Anne.  See 
Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.); Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng).  
The decision to recognize private property rights had the effect of shifting from the government to 
private parties the authority to decide how resources should be allocated to promote innovation 
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Here there is a clear contrast with tradable environmental allowances 
(TEAs), another of Professor Rose’s examples of enablement measures.17  Like 
IPRs, TEAs are formally created property rights that depend on government 
action.  TEAs, however, can be distinguished from IPRs because they are 
necessary in the first place only because of background government regulation.  
Without government regulation of environmental pollutants, the possibility of 
and need for TEAs would disappear.  Conversely, the need for inventions and 
creative output exists independent of any government regulation.  The question 
for IP policy is how best to encourage production of such works in light of 
other societal values.18 
B. Political Criticisms of Privatization Measures 
This leads me to my second general concern about Rose’s thesis.  Even 
accepting Rose’s characterization as privatization efforts of each of the trends 
she identifies, Rose’s criticisms of those efforts strike me to some extent as 
unfair attempts to evaluate specific instances of privatization against general 
normative arguments in favor of private property that may or may not have 
motivated the particular privatization effort. 
The argument that privatization promotes democracy is a general, 
comparative argument that more private control of decision-making is better 
for democratic culture than is less private control.19  The specific political 
arguments for privatization that Rose identifies—the priority argument, the 
power-spreading argument, the distraction argument, the symbolic argument, 
and the civilizing argument20—do not necessarily suggest any particular forms 
of private property (except perhaps the most fundamental, real property rights), 
but rather provide general support for a system that recognizes more private 
property, rather than less. 
Take as an example the notion that recognizing private property promotes 
democracy because it enables commerce, which tends to “soften manners”—
what Rose calls the civilizing argument.21  That argument suggests that trade 
 
and creative production.  For more in-depth discussions of the history of patent and copyright 
protection, see PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY (1994); Adam Mossoff, Rethinking 
the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History 1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255 (2001); 
see also Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 1313, 1315–16 (2005) (detailing the political background of the Statute of Monopolies). 
 17. See Rose, supra note 1, at 698 nn.36–37 and accompanying text (referring to the United 
States’ program for tradable emission rights in the gasses that form acid rain and the European 
Union’s proposals to use tradable rights to control carbon dioxide emissions). 
 18. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 
283, 285 (1996) (stating that “[c]opyright law’s perennial dilemma is to determine where 
exclusive rights should end and unrestrained public access should begin”). 
 19. See id. at 3. 
 20. See id. at 15, 19, 26, 31, 37. 
 21. Id. at 37. 
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requires individuals to get to know each other and understand what each other 
value, and it acknowledges that private property is a precondition of trade.22  
For the most part, the civilizing argument does not depend on what particular 
types of property a society chooses to recognize, as long as the forms of 
property it recognizes are tradable.  Thus, the civilizing argument does not 
necessarily support recognition of any particular property, even if it strongly 
supports a system of more private property.  Criticisms of a particular 
privatization effort for failing to civilize then undermine neither the particular 
privatization effort nor the civilizing argument generally. 
The broader point is that each of the various arguments in favor of private 
property that Rose articulates has more or less to say about different forms of 
privatization.  The political arguments are not exclusive of one another, nor do 
they purport to offer totalizing views of privatization.  Indeed, some forms of 
privatization may not have been based on any of the political arguments but 
instead were motivated principally by economic concerns.  In those cases, 
arguments about how the efforts measure up to the political claims regarding 
privatization probably have little to say about their desirability. 
For example, Rose criticizes efforts to privatize electric and telephone 
service on the ground that electric and telephone company workers sometimes 
are rude and offer poor service.23  Similarly, Rose criticizes some divestiture 
measures for failing to spread power very far and for failing to act as a 
distraction from politics.24  To some extent these are indications that 
privatization in some cases has not been done very effectively more than they 
are arguments against privatization.25  Even on their own terms, however, it is 
not clear that Rose’s arguments demonstrate a failure of privatization.  If 
divestitures have been primarily economically motivated, and if deregulation 
of water was not particularly intended to spread power but simply make the 
delivery of water cheaper and more dependable, a goal Rose confirms 
privatization largely has met, then the fact that those measures failed to spread 
power is probably not a particularly trenchant criticism. 
I make this point to stress that, when we are measuring IP against the 
political arguments, we should evaluate different intellectual property regimes 
independently of one another.  “Intellectual property” is a big tent, and the 
various forms of protection are motivated to some extent by different concerns.  
 
 22. See id. at 37. 
 23. Rose, supra note 1, at 707–10. 
 24. Id. at 699–700. 
 25. Questions about how well privatization is done clearly have a lot to do with the state of 
underlying political institutions, and in that sense, Rose’s thesis is undeniably true.  
Privatization’s ability to deliver on its promises depends on political institutions and their 
willingness and ability to perform a variety of functions fairly and effectively.  But we should not 
lose track of the dynamic effect of privatization and its potential for incremental change of the 
political institutions themselves. 
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Copyright proponents, for example, have relied on political arguments much 
more explicitly than have patent proponents.26  As a result, copyright law is 
more susceptible to criticism on political grounds, whereas some political 
criticisms of patent law, like the political criticisms of deregulation, probably 
seem to patent proponents and policy makers neither here nor there. 
II.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEMOCRACY 
Even if intellectual property does not fit neatly into Rose’s privatization 
scheme, there are at least a couple of ways in which IP rights impact 
democracy that can be directly evaluated.  At risk of redundancy, granularity is 
important here.  The democratic impact of copyright protection is quite 
different than that of patent protection.  By lumping all of IP together, in my 
view Professor Rose misses the opportunity to evaluate the particular effects of 
specific rights. 
A. Copyright and Democratic Expression 
First, copyright scholars have long argued that copyright promotes 
diversity of cultural expression, which is good for democracy.27  Copyright 
protects individuals in their expression and makes the success or failure of that 
expression a function of the market, rather than the whim of the sovereign.  By 
contrast, pre-Statute of Anne regulatory systems were intimately related to 
censorship.28  In medieval England, for both political and economic reasons, 
the Crown awarded to individual printers the exclusive right to print particular 
books.29  Later the Crown vested the Stationers Company with a monopoly 
over publishing and relied on it to censor political dissent.30  As Goldstein 
observed, the printers enjoyed and enforced a monopoly over publishing, but 
the printers were only allowed to publish books licensed by the Crown.31  
 
 26. See Netanel, supra note 18, at 347–64 (stating that copyright law supports democracy 
through encouragement of creative expression of political and social ideas and through giving the 
creators of such expression financial support). 
 27. See, e.g., id. (arguing that copyright is a state measure that uses market institutions to 
enhance the democratic character of civil society, by serving production and structural functions).  
The notion that copyright is intended to promote democratic society dates back to the founding 
era and can be seen in discussion of the first federal copyright statute in 1790.  See id. at 289 & 
n.17 (citing BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 137 
(1967)). 
 28. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 40. 
 29. See id. (“By granting an exclusive right—a patent, it was called—to print particular 
literary or legal or educational works to a given bookseller, the English sovereigns were able to 
tap into a continuing stream of loyalty and income.”).  For other thorough discussions of English 
copyright history, see LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
(1968) and BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT (1967). 
 30. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 42. 
 31. Id. 
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Thus, the Crown could rely on the Stationers Company to carry out its political 
will. 
Under [the Licensing Act], the Crown determined what works could be 
published; under the printing patent, the Stationers suppressed trade not only in 
unauthorized copies of licensed works, but in unlicensed works as well.  The 
Stationers got the economic rewards of monopoly; in return, the Crown got 
from the Stationers a ruthlessly efficient enforcer of the censorship.32 
By recognizing copyright in authors and rejecting royal privileges in 
printing, the modern copyright system stripped the sovereign of an effective 
control over the content of publications, leaving to market forces the ultimate 
fate of a particular publication.  This development, to be sure, was not an 
unqualified good.  One potential advantage of government subsidization of 
intellectual production is that it allows for consideration of factors beyond 
potential economic success, and we might have good reason to think that 
certain forms of expression that are not economically valuable are nevertheless 
desirable.  In those cases, the market might not properly reflect true societal 
demand, and those forms of expression will be under-produced.33 
Governments in the United States and in Great Britain, among other 
countries, have recognized that risk, and for that reason copyright has never 
been the only way in which either country encourages cultural production.  As 
Shubha Ghosh points out, governments also subsidize cultural infrastructure, 
“create cultural inputs that benefit private associations,” and can “aid in 
establishing rules that facilitate private associations.”34  Governments also can 
provide direct grants to certain producers of cultural material, through entities 
like the National Endowment for the Arts.35 
But if democracy is our concern, there are at least as many reasons to be 
concerned about other forms of government encouragement of cultural 
production as there are about leaving those decisions to the market.  Grant and 
infrastructure funding are very likely to follow political winds, as we have seen 
with regard to funding of National Public Radio, the Public Broadcasting 
Service, and the National Endowment for the Arts.36  As these modern 
examples make clear, those who control the funding are likely to want to 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons 
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 965 (2005) (noting that the market often does not accurately 
measure or respond to societal demand). 
 34. Ghosh, supra note 5, at 411. 
 35. See generally id. at 411–12. 
 36. See Rob Owen, ‘Politics Theater’ Drags on at PBS, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 
14, 2005, at W-37 (“Maintaining its government funding has been an issue for the entirety of 
PBS’s existence, but lately the media company has found itself wandering through a political 
minefield.”). 
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control the content of the creative output they fund.37  As Justice Scalia noted 
in a recent speech about government funding of the arts, it has long been the 
case that “he who pays the piper calls the tune.”38  The risk that governments 
which fund content will seek to call the creative tune is a lesson history teaches 
exceedingly well. 
In the final analysis, modern copyright law reflects a belief that we are 
better off relying on markets to provide the incentives for cultural production.39  
Though markets sometimes fail, the possibility of failure has to be measured 
against the political risks inherent in greater government involvement in 
production.40 
The scope of copyright law will have a lot to say about how well it furthers 
the goal of democratization, of course, as we are reminded by criticisms of 
copyright’s effect on culture.41  Overly broad protection threatens to stifle the 
very expressive freedom copyright protection promises.  If, however, market-
driven copyright systems by and large succeed in creating environments in 
which diverse views flourish, then copyright, on balance, helps create 
democratic culture.42 
 
 37. In 1999, the Brooklyn Museum of Art sued the City of New York when the city withheld 
funding for the Museum because Mayor Giuliani was offended by some of the art the museum 
displayed, particularly a painting that depicted the Virgin Mary decorated with elephant dung.  
Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Sci. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 186, 190 (E.D.N.Y. 
1999).  The court entered a preliminary injunction against the City on the ground that the decision 
to withhold funding violated the First Amendment.  Id. at 205. 
 38. See Daniel J. Wakin, Scalia Defends Government’s Right to Deny Art Funds, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2005, at B5.  The saying generally is attributed to the fable of the Pied Piper of 
Hamelin.  J. A. Spittal, He Who Pays the Piper Calls the Tune (2003), http://www.cambridge 
conference2003.com/camconf/papers/3-2.pdf#search=‘he%20who%20pays%20the%20piper%20 
calls%20the%20tune‘. 
 39. See Netanel, supra note 18, at 345–48. 
 40. The distinction I have drawn is between the market on the one hand and government 
subsidization on the other.  There is, of course, a third possibility that has sometimes played a 
historical role—the support of elite patrons.  Relying on that type of support lessens to some 
degree the risk of undue government control of content, but it does little to ensure the type of 
diverse selection of views characteristic of democratic societies.  Cf. id. at 288–89 (arguing that 
“‘sustained works of authorship’—books, articles, films, songs and paintings—form a central part 
of democratic discourse, and that a robust copyright is a necessary (though not necessarily 
sufficient) condition both for the creation and dissemination of that expression and for its 
independent and pluralist character”). 
 41. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (Penguin 
Press, 2004). 
 42. See Barbara Ringer, Two Hundred Years of American Copyright Law, in TWO HUNDRED 
YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW 117, 118 (Am. 
Bar Assoc. ed., 1977) (“We know, empirically, that strong copyright systems are characteristic of 
relatively free societies.”). 
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B. IP and Conditions Precedent to Democracy 
There is another way in which IPRs have an effect on democratization.  
Recognition of IPRs is one way to promote the economic conditions conducive 
to democratic development.  A growing body of research suggests that 
intellectual property protection can have a significant effect on a country’s 
economic prosperity.43  Countries that protect intellectual property achieve 
greater foreign investment and raise their citizens’ standards of living 
substantially faster.44  This should hardly come as a surprise.  IPRs are 
intended to promote innovation, and innovation has a significant effect on 
economic growth.45 
 
 43. See Carsten Fink & Carlos A. Primo Braga, How Stronger Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights Affects International Trade Flows, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
DEVELOPMENT 19, 20 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT] (finding that stronger IPRs have a significantly positive effect on 
total trade, though also finding stronger patent rights irrelevant for certain high-technology 
products); Beata Smarzynksa Javorcik, The Composition of Foreign Direct Investment and 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Evidence from Transition Economies, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 133, 134 (study of multinational 
companies’ investment decisions; finding that weak IPRs have a negative effect on the likelihood 
of investments being made and that companies avoid investing in local production when IPRs are 
weak and instead focus on distribution).  In the introduction, the editors conclude that the 
empirical evidence points to a positive role for IPRs in stimulating formal technology transfer, 
through foreign direct investment in production and research and development facilities and 
through cross-border technology licensing.  Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus, Why We Study 
Intellectual Property Rights and What We Have Learned, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 1, 8. 
 44. See generally Lee G. Branstetter et al., Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights 
Increase International Technology Transfer?  Empirical Evidence from U.S. Firm-Level Data, 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 11516, 2005), http://www.people.hbs.edu/ 
ffoley/IPRReform.pdf (presenting statistical analysis of firm-level data on U.S. multinational 
companies conducted at the International Investment Division, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
U.S. Department of Commerce and concluding that their “results collectively imply that U.S. 
multinationals respond to changes in IPR regimes abroad by significantly increasing technology 
transfer to reforming countries” and that research and development spending by affiliates 
increases after IPR reform).  Research on the impact of stronger IPR on domestic innovation in 
particular is mixed.  See id. at 2 n.3 (citing studies from 1995, 2000, 2001, and 2002 that find no 
impact on domestic innovation and other studies from 2001 and 2005 that do find an impact). 
 45. Recognizing intellectual property rights is not the only way in which countries can 
promote innovation.  See Press Release, European Commission, State Aid: Commission Launches 
Public Consultation on Measures to Improve State Aid for Innovation, (Sept. 21, 2005), 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1169&format=HTML&aged=
0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.  The Press Release discusses the measures states can take to 
promote innovation under the Communication on State Aid for Innovation, including: 
1) support for the creation and growth of innovative start-ups (through tax exemptions and 
subsidies); 
2) additional flexibility for state aid to risk capital; 
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And economic growth and stability clearly aid democratic development.  
As today’s world events make clear, it is very difficult to build a stable 
political environment when citizens are excluded from the prosperity shared by 
the developed world.  I do not mean here only that property and commerce 
distract people from other strife,46 although that certainly may be true, but 
rather that divergent economic conditions sometimes are themselves the source 
of discontent in developing areas.47  Rose herself provides evidence of this 
dynamic when she points to India’s experience with privatization and notes 
that the Congress Party and its allies defeated the BJP, the chief sponsor of 
India’s deregulation efforts, largely because of the dissatisfaction of rural 
citizens who felt they were left out of the good economic times.48  If 
intellectual property aids technology transfer and helps create greater economic 
opportunity, it can help create the stability on which civil society depends. 
There is also a power-spreading argument to be made here, though a less 
direct one.  According to the power-spreading thesis, private property 
promotes democracy because ownership of private property gives citizens a 
sense of security that enables their participation in the political process.49  That 
thesis then argues for recognition of any private rights that offer greater 
economic security than citizens previously enjoyed.  Intellectual property 
rights can offer that security, not so much because ownership of intellectual 
property rights is widespread, but because recognition of IPRs enables greater 
economic growth. 
This point should not be overstated; Rose rightly cautions against giving 
any institution too much credit for democratization.50  Even the most optimistic 
economic reports echo Rose’s important caveat that the effectiveness of IP 
reform depends on the existence of other governmental institutions in which 
 
3) expanding the scope of current state aid rules for Research and Development and 
authorising state aid for SMEs [small- and medium-sized enterprises] engaged in 
innovation activities (such as commercially-usable prototypes, technological design or 
feasibility studies); 
4) subsidies for SMEs to buy services from innovation intermediaries; 
5) subsidies for SMEs to recruit highly qualified researchers and engineers and to benefit 
from exchange of personnel with universities and large companies; and 
6) supporting the development of poles of excellence through collaboration, clustering, 
and projects of common European interest. 
Id. 
 46. See Rose, supra note 1, at 710. 
 47. See generally Juan Forero, Latin America Fails to Deliver on Basic Needs, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 22, 2005, at A1 (illustrating that the high cost of utility services in countries like Bolivia 
contributes to political instability). 
 48. See id. at 28–29. 
 49. See Rose, supra note 1, at 705–10. 
 50. See id. at 693 (stating that “privatization alone cannot do all the work of 
democratization”). 
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the rights can be maintained and enforced.51  So it cannot be said that 
recognition of IPRs is a sufficient, or even necessary, condition for democratic 
reform.  But there are two general conclusions we can draw from the evidence: 
(1) it is no accident that most of the world’s unrest is taking place in 
developing countries; and (2) recognition of IPRs clearly has a positive effect 
on economic conditions, which can help create greater stability.  Thus, IPRs 
deserve a seat at the policy table when democratization is the goal. 
C. Other Democratization Issues Relating to IP 
Rose makes two additional observations that are potentially relevant to the 
question of the impact of IPRs.  First, Rose notes that the privatization efforts 
might arouse rather than dampen political passions if the effort affects those 
with vested interests.52  This seems much more likely to be a possibility in the 
deregulation context,53 and very unlikely to apply in the context of intellectual 
property.  As I discussed earlier, unlike deregulation, in the context of IP there 
is no “status quo” that is affected by any particular movement.  Indeed, it is 
hard in the IP context even to identify a particular shift in vested interests that 
might arouse opposition, since the subjects of IP protection come into 
existence simultaneously with protection.  Thus, recognition of IPRs is not 
likely to shift the use of already existing assets, as water deregulation might.54 
Finally, what about IP’s symbolic role?  Rose argues that IP represents an 
area of privatization which “cuts fairly sharply” against the symbolic argument 
because IP is more a lesson in other people’s rights than in one’s own.55  That 
really is an empirical claim about how most people regard IP rights, and my 
sense is that it has the greatest purchase in the context of copyright.  The fight 
against file sharing has had little effect on norms, other than to harden the 
 
 51. See Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus, supra note 43, at 2, 12 (stating that “the effects of 
awarding stronger rights to protect technology will depend on the underlying circumstances in 
each country” and “a reformed legal regime is likely to be a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for local technology development”). 
 52. See Rose, supra note 1, at 711. 
 53. With respect to deregulation, it might be true that, in the short run, privatization efforts 
would have to confront resistance from those with vested interests.  But if it is true in the long 
run, then one wonders whether the effort really would enhance overall welfare.  If it is just an 
interested group opposing, then presumably the rest of the people would have a greater interest 
and cause greater unrest if the system was not fixed to benefit them. 
 54. See id. at 711.  A possible exception might be industries that depend for their existence 
on the absence of strong IPRs, perhaps makers of generic pharmaceuticals. 
 55. Id. at 715 (“[M]ost people perceive themselves as obligated by IP rights, since the rights 
belong to others.”). 
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resistance of some.56  Rose’s claim certainly has resonance with regard to 
pharmaceutical drugs as well.57 
But just because powerful companies and industrialized nations have used 
their power to structure IP regimes to benefit themselves 
disproportionately58—a dynamic not unique to IP but pervasive in any property 
regime and indeed any system of government regulation—does not mean that 
IP necessarily favors Goliath.  Indeed, the symbolic story is a little murkier 
than Rose lets on.  In the patent context, and to a lesser extent in the copyright 
context, there are many recent stories of IP serving as the sword of David.  
Microsoft has been named as a defendant in numerous recent patent cases,59 
and some of the smaller plaintiffs in those cases have won substantial 
verdicts.60  Indeed, IP might be the only thing that allows the Davids of the 
technology world to compete with Microsoft at all; in the absence of IP rights, 
Microsoft can bring its greater resources to bear on any good idea and reap all 
of the benefits. 
That IP-like rights can work in the little guy’s favor is demonstrated by 
Rose’s suggestion that the “dictatorial edges” of IP can be softened in part by 
recognizing a form of IP protection for folklore or traditional knowledge, 
subjects that have heretofore been excluded from the IP regime.61  That 
suggestion reflects a recognition of the power of property rights—the solution 
to overly aggressive practices, at least in some cases, is property.  Here, like in 
the examples above, the little guy can use property to fend off the imperialists.  
Rose argues that this undermines the legitimacy of the IP incentive theory,62 
 
 56. See David Scharfenberg, Defying a Music Industry Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 
2006, at 14WC-3 (stating that some data reflect growth in file sharing in the last two years while 
other data suggest a downturn). 
 57. See Rose, supra note 1, at 716 & accompanying notes. 
 58. See id. at 616–17. 
 59. Peter Galli, Microsoft Settles with InterTrust, EWEEK.COM, Apr. 12, 2004, 
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1565851,00.asp. 
 60. A district court awarded Eolas, a company spun off from the University of California, 
$521 million for Microsoft’s infringement of Eolas’s Web browser patent.  See Eolas Tech. Inc. 
v. Microsoft Corp., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1939 (N.D. Ill. 2004), vacated in part, 339 F.3d 1325, 1332, 
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005).  The verdict may be reduced when it 
ultimately returns to the district court, if the case is not settled first. 
 61. See Rose, supra note 1, at 716–17.  The historical exclusion of these forms of expression 
from the IP regime is a good example of Rose’s central thesis—that the ability of private property 
to fulfill its political role depends in part on the underlying political institutions.  See generally id.  
One possible conclusion is that these kinds of distributional concerns are so pervasive that no 
property regime can possibly achieve its theoretical ends—that allocation of property rights is 
very likely to be drawn according to political power, so that the existence of property rights will 
do little to affect politics.  But my own view is that the distributional problems, while real and 
needing to be accounted for, have not undermined property’s generally positive influence on 
politics. 
 62. Id. at 717. 
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but the utilitarian incentive justification need not be the only basis of 
protection.  Property can and does serve autonomy interests.63 
III.  CONCLUSION 
To summarize, the overwhelming evidence confirms Rose’s broad thesis 
that IPRs are far from sufficient to secure democracy, and that we should pay 
close attention to scope.  But when we parse out the different forms of 
intellectual property protection, the evidence also suggests that the case for 
IPRs as promoters of democracy is somewhat stronger than Rose lets on.  
Thus, intellectual property deserves its seat at the policy table, and we are wise 
to pay it some heed. 
 
 
 63. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 
(1982). 
